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STATEMENT OF THE PETITION AND RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Statement of the Petition 
1. This is a petition for rehearing from the Opinion entered by this Court 
on January 25, 1995. (See Addendum) 
2. This petition originates from an appeal from a trial held on June 23, 
1992, in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya. 
3. The final Judgment and the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
was entered on December 23, 1992. 
4. The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Third District Court on March 
2, 1993, with the Docketing Statement filed on or about April 13, 1993. 
II. Statement of the Facts 
This petition incorporates by reference the "Statement of Relevant Facts" 
contained in Brief of Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF PETTTTON 
This case is the Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins. Brown and Ounnell. 
Inc.. 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989) case revisited with the trial court ruling 
contrary to the precedent of this Court. In the Opinion, this Court follows Price-
Orem as to one issue, and ignores it on two others. This Court properly found 
that pre-judgment interest is not available in this case, but failed to follow Price-
Orem with respect to the measure of damages and costs. Based upon these 
2 
errors, which are analyzed in more detail below, Calder urges this Court to revisit 
these issues and follow its previous rulings in Price-Orem. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN A NEGLIGENT SURVEY 
CASE IS AN ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF THE REAL ESTATE AT 
THE TIME OF THE NEGLIGENT ACT. 
Appellees filed this lawsuit against Calder asserting the cause of action 
based on negligence.1 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is a causal 
connection between a negligent act of Calder which resulted in some damage to 
the Appellees, the measure of damages used by the trial court was inappropriate. 
Further, the law cited by this Court in upholding the trial court's ruling is 
contrary to this Court's prior ruling in Price-Orem. a case which is directly on 
point. Accordingly, the Opinion acts as a reversal of Price-Orem. 
In review, this Court held in Prlce-Orem. that when measuring damages in 
the negligent surveying case: 
the measure of damages for permanent injury to real property is the 
difference between the market value of the property immediately 
before and immediately after the injury.2 (emphasis added) 
This Court went on to state that: 
1
 See, Third Party Complaint. 
2
 Price-Qrem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown, and Gunnel, 
Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989). 
3 
[bjecause liability attached at the time of the loss [the appraisal made 
near that time] is more relevant to the actual loss incurred under this 
measure of damages than the subsequent historical data. (Id.) (See 
also Aultv. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987). 
The Appellees purchased the property in 1971 for $5,500.3 The negligent 
act, if any, by Calder occurred in 1972. Therefore, the damages would be the 
difference in value of the property right before the negligent act and the value of 
the property right after the negligent act in 1972. 
The trial court, however, inappropriately considered the value of the land 
19834 in comparison to the value of the property at the time of trial. As set forth 
in Price-Orem. the analysis of subsequent historical data is an inappropriate 
basis to measure damages. The Opinion issued by this Court does not follow 
Price-Orem. Calder respectfully requests that this Court review this issue, follow 
it previous ruling in Price-Orem and remand this issue to the trial court to receive 
evidence as to the value of the property at the time of the alleged negligent act. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF FAIR MARKET VALUE IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Assuming that the fair market value of the property at the time of trial is 
pertinent, which the above argument and Prlce-Orem represent that it is not, the 
3
 Ex, P-6. 
4
 Right ly R. 401 - 402. Wilkerson R. 436. 
4 
trial court's finding of the fair market value is not supported by the evidence. In 
referring to the evidence presented, the only valuations given are from the 
testimony of the Appellees' expert witness. He testified of an offer for the property 
in the amount of $10,000, but the Appellees turned the offer down.5 When asked 
what the present value of the property was, Appellees' expert testified that it was 
worth $8,000, not $6,000 as stated on Ex. P-9.6 This exhibit was only admitted 
for only illustrative purposes. In closing arguments, Appellees' counsel confirmed 
that the evidence presented at trial was that the present value of the property was 
$8,000.7 Appellees' counsel in oral arguments before this Court once again 
reiterated the value as $8,000.8 Appellees have not claimed otherwise. 
There is no rational, legal or factual basis whatsoever to support the 
accounting as set forth in Exhibit P-9. The trial court clearly applied an incorrect 
measure of damages. Appellees acknowledge the error. This award must be 
reversed or modified to correctly reflect the evidence presented at trial as 
confirmed by Appellees' counsel. 
5
 R. 445, 450. 
6
 R. 448. 
7
 Closing Arg. pg. 10. 
8
 Oral Arguments, Tape #447, counter 2095 and 2132. 
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POINT HI 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED COSTS IN THIS CASE 
As set forth at length in Appellant's Brief, there are parameters which are 
provided to the courts when it comes to awarding costs. Many of the costs 
claimed are inappropriate, contrary to law, completely contrary to the Minute 
Entry ruling of the trial court, and/or confirmed as being inappropriate by 
Appellees1 counsel during oral arguments before this Court.9 
Calder has described in great detail the errors and abuse of discretion which 
was committed by the trial court in the awarding of costs as they relate to witness, 
clerk, constable, and reporter fees along with the "miscellaneous costs" claimed 
by the Appellees. Furthermore, Appellees did not dispute the assertions set forth 
in Appellant's Brief and Appellees counsel during oral argument stated that at 
least three of the costs awarded were inappropriate and should be disallowed.10 
Despite this acknowledgment of error, the Opinion affirms the awarding of costs 
in a footnote. 
Accordingly, Calder requests that this Court revisit this issue and reverse 
the trial courts award of costs. 
9
 See, Closing Argument, Tape #447. 
10
 See, Closing Argument, Tape #447. 
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CONCLUSION 
Assuming Calder was negligent, the law set forth in Price-Orem does not 
support the amount of damages awarded by the trial court. The appropriate 
measure of damages for a negligent survey is to compare the fair market value 
both immediately before and immediately after the negligent act in 1972, This 
analysis was not followed and the award must be reversed. 
Nevertheless, if this Court were to uphold the valuation process of the 
damages, the amount must, at a minimum, be reduced to reflect the evidence 
presented as conceded by Appellees1 counsel. 
The trial court improperly assessed costs in this case. The trial court 
erroneously awarded costs contrary to its own Minute Entry decision, contrary to 
law, costs from other actions, which Appellees1 counsel has confirmed as being 
improper. This Court must reverse the trial court's awarding of costs. 
This petition for rehearing is hereby certified to be brought in good faith and 
not for delay and is respectfully submitted this _ of February, 1995. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
By: HUtftiU 
Robert F. Babcock 
Brian J. Babcock 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
I certify that on this £ _ day of February, 1995,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Ephram H. Fankhauser 
243 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
7^^^7-HOrJL 
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ADDENDUM 
9 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Attorneys: Robert F. Babcock and Brian J. Babcock, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Wilkins. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
In this third-party suit, Glen H. Calder appeals the trial 
court's judgment in favor of Eugene E. Kightly, Helen L. Kightly, 
Harry D. Kreis, and Peggy R. Kreis Barnett (third-party 
plaintiffs). We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
On June 2, 1971, third-party plaintiffs bought thirty acres 
of land in Duschesne County for $5,550 from Strawberry River 
Estates (Strawberry River) by a uniform real estate contract*1 
The original parcel was "T"-shaped, with about twenty acres west 
of Red Creek and about ten acres east of Red Creek. On October 
3, 1971, by handwritten agreement,2 Strawberry River conveyed to 
third-party plaintiffs two unmarketable five-acre parcels on each 
side of the ten acres east of Red Creek. Strawberry River drew 
up a new uniform real estate contract back-dated to June 2, 1971, 
using a new metes and bounds description which—unbeknownst to 
third-party plaintiffs—contained an incorrect point of beginning 
one thousand feet east of where the description in the original 
contract and the handwritten agreement began.3 The new 
description omitted the twenty acres west of Red Creek. 
1. The metes and bounds description of the parcel on this 
contract stated: 
Beginning 990' South of the North line of 
Section 11, Township 4 South, Range 8 West, 
USM, to center of Red Creek, Thence West 
1320,/ Thence South 660', Thence East 1320', 
Thence North 165', Thence East 1320', Thence 
North 330', Thence West 1320', Thence North 
165' to beginning point at center of Red 
Creek, Consisting of Thirty (30) acres and no 
more. 
2. The agreement reads in pertinent part as follows: 
This is to certify that all of lots 30 and 31 
along Red Creek . . . as platted by Edmund W. 
Allen, Civil Engineer . . . , shall be 
included in the Contract of Sale . . . and 
that the Contract of Sale will be modified to 
include this additional acreage at no 
additional cost, and that the total acreage 
will amount to forty (acres) total on both 
sides of the creek. 
3. The new metes and bounds description reads: 
Beginning at a Point 320 feet West and 990 
feet South of the Northeast Corner of Section 
11, Township 4 South and Range 8 West, 
U.S.M., thence West 2640 feet, thence South 
660 feet, thence East 2640 feet, thence North 
660 feet to Point of Beginning. Consisting 
of forty acres. 
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A few months later, Merrill Gunderson, Floyd Ostler, and 
John Stafford were hired to survey the forty acres.4 They placed 
rebar stakes in the property's corners, showing boundaries 
consistent with third-party plaintiffs' understanding and the 
informal description of the property in the handwritten 
agreement, but inconsistent with the second metes and bounds 
description. Subsequently, third-party plaintiffs received a 
survey certificate dated May 15, 1972 and inscribed, "WILSON & 
CALDER CONSULTING ENGINEERS AND SURVEYORS DUCHESNE UTAH." The 
certificate showed a diagram of the property consistent with 
third-party plaintiffs' understanding and the informal 
description of the property from the handwritten agreement. 
However, the certificate also showed the incorrect metes and 
bounds description from the second real estate contract around 
the diagram's perimeter. Because Gunderson, Ostler, and Stafford 
were not licensed surveyors, they had paid Calder to sign the 
certificate, which stated: 
I, Glen H. Calder, do hereby certify 
that I am a Registered Land Surveyor in the 
State of Utah, and that the plat described 
hereon portrays a survey made by me or under 
my direction. I further certify that the 
above plat correctly shows the true 
4. The parties dispute who hired the surveyors. Third-party 
plaintiffs claim they hired the surveyors, while Calder claims 
Strawberry River hired the surveyors. The trial court made the 
following findings regarding this issue: 
7. Although Third Party Plaintiffs had 
been shown the approximate location of the 40 
acre parcel, they made inquiry of Strawberry 
River Estates about surveying the property. 
Third Party Plaintiffs did not know any other 
property owners who had had their property 
surveyed. Because of their concerns and 
reservations about the property description 
in the new Uniform Real Estate Contract, they 
wanted to establish the location and 
boundaries of their property. 
8. Acting on information given by 
representatives of Strawberry River Estates, 
Third Party Plaintiffs (the Kightlys) 
contacted a surveyor at the Duchesne office 
of Third Party Defendant, Wilson Calder. Mr. 
Kightly asked that the subject property be 
surveyed to establish an exact location and 
boundaries, leaving a copy of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (Ex. P-6) with the metes 
and bounds description of the 40 acre parcel. 
930525-CA 3 
dimensions of the property surveyed and of 
the improvements located thereon; and further 
that there are no encroachments on said 
property. 
For the next several years, third-party plaintiffs used and 
improved what they believed to be their forty acres, including 
the twenty acres west of Red Creek. When they paid the balance 
of the purchase price, they received a warranty deed dated 
October 24, 1980, with a metes and bounds description similar to 
the incorrect one on the second uniform real estate contract. 
The only difference between the two descriptions was that the 
warranty deed stated, "Beginning at a point 330 feet West," where 
the contract had stated, "Beginning at a Point 320 feet West." 
Third-party plaintiff Eugene Kightly testified he had noted the 
ten-foot difference but had not been alarmed by what he 
considered to be a slight discrepancy and typographical error. 
Third-party plaintiffs sold the property to Robert and Karol 
Klinger (the Klingers) on July 23, 1983, for $32,000. Before 
buying the property, the Klingers had visited it with a realtor 
two or three times, using the described survey certificate to 
inspect the premises. Third-party plaintiffs accompanied the 
Klingers on one visit and—relying on the survey certificate— 
showed them the rebar stakes marking twenty acres west of Red 
Creek and twenty acres east of Red Creek. The warranty deed to 
the Klingers showed the same metes and bounds description as the 
warranty deed previously received by third-party plaintiffs. 
In early 1985, the Klingers discovered the problem with the 
property descriptions. Third-party plaintiffs were notified that 
the survey's metes and bounds description placed the west 
property boundary only a few feet west of Red Creek and was off 
by about one thousand feet. The Klingers successfully sued 
third-party plaintiffs for rescission. Third-party plaintiffs 
were ordered to return the payments Klingers had already made, 
including taxes and interest paid, totaling $13,851.59. When the 
Klingers reconveyed the property to third-party plaintiffs, its 
value had substantially decreased since 1983. 
In May of 1986, third-party plaintiffs sued Calder for 
negligence, asserting he failed to "properly survey and locate 
the subject property." The trial court granted Calder's motion 
to dismiss the case on the ground that the statute of limitation 
barred third-party plaintiffs7 suit regarding work done in 1972. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) (1987) (providing "an action for 
relief not otherwise provided for by law" must be brought within 
four years). In its ruling, the court rejected third-party 
plaintiffs' argument that the court should apply the "discovery 
930525-CA 4 
rule"5 to toll the statute of limitation. Third-party plaintiffs 
had asserted that their "cause of action arose when the mistake 
was discovered, in January or February of 1985." Third-party 
plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which reversed the 
trial court and held "[t]he discovery rule should be applied to 
the statute of limitation for surveyor negligence under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25(2)." Klinaer v. Rightlv, 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 
1990). 
On remand, a trial was held to determine Calder's liability. 
The trial court found Calder "negligent in the survey of the 
property, which resulted in Plaintiff selling the wrong 
property." The court awarded third-party plaintiffs "$29,383.00, 
together with interest thereon . . . from July 30, 1987, the date 
of reconveyance of the subject property to Third Party 
Plaintiffs, in the amount of $15,915.80, together with costs in 
the amount of $1,279.72." Calder appeals from that judgment. 
ISSUES 
Calder asserts the following on appeal: (1) The trial court 
misapplied the discovery rule to the statute of limitation; (2) 
John Stafford's diary should not have been excluded as hearsay 
evidence; (3) the trial court erred in finding and calculating 
damages; and (4) prejudgment interest should not have been 
awarded.6 
5. In an earlier appeal of this case, the Utah Supreme Court 
explained the "discovery rule": 
Under the discovery rule, a cause of action 
does not accrue and the statute of limitation 
does not begin to run until the plaintiff 
learns of or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have learned of the facts 
which give rise to the cause of action. The 
discovery rule functions as an exception to 
the normal application of a statute of 
limitation. 
Klinaer v. Rightly. 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990) (footnotes 
omitted). 
6. Calder also argues that certain costs should not have been 
awarded and that the trial court should not have denied without a 
hearing his objections to the court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
Calder7s argument about the award of costs is merely a 
labeling problem. The trial court included "costs" from both the 
Klinger rescission trial and third-party plaintiffs' appeal of 
(continued...) 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Statute of Limitation 
Calder makes the following argument: Because third-party 
plaintiffs knew in 1980 that their deed showed a metes and bounds 
description ten feet different from that shown in the second 
uniform real estate contract, they should have investigated and 
discovered the larger problem of the survey then. Thus, the 
trial court should have found the discovery rule tolled the four-
year statute of limitation only until 1980, and barred the action 
brought in 1986. 
Calder asks this court to revisit the exact issue the 
supreme court decided in the prior appeal. See Klinaer v. 
Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990). Because application of 
the discovery rule is a question of law, Id. at 869, the supreme 
court reviewed the case de novo and weighed the prejudice that 
would accrue to each side if the rule were applied. Deciding the 
discovery rule should be applied in this case to toll the statute 
of limitation and allow third-party plaintiffs' case to go 
forward, the court said: MTh[ird-party plaintiffs] had no reason 
to suspect that the survey was inaccurate, nor did they refrain 
from doing anything that might reasonably have been expected of 
them that could have disclosed the error." Id. at 872. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the prior ruling of the 
supreme court is controlling as the law of this case. See 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946-47 (Utah 1987); Murohv v. 
Crosland. 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 59 n.l (Utah App. 1994). The 
trial court had no choice but to do what it did—comply with the 
supreme court's determination and hold a trial on the merits, 
without further addressing the statute of limitation issue. 
6. (...continued) 
Calder's dismissal from that action. Those amounts should have 
been awarded as damages, not costs. Cf. South Sanpitch Co. v. 
Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1988) ("[W]hen the natural 
consequence of one's negligence is another's involvement in a 
dispute with a third party, attorney fees reasonably incurred in 
resolving the dispute are recoverable from the negligent party as 
an element of damages.") 
The argument that the trial court improperly denied Calder's 
request for a hearing is without merit; thus, we decline to 
address it. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989). 
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II. Hearsay Evidence 
A. Admitting business record 
Calder argues that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it refused to admit into evidence the diary of 
surveyor John Stafford pursuant to the business record exception 
to the hearsay rule. Stafford died before the trial, but left 
dated notes about the survey in a business diary. Calder/s 
attorney offered the diary as evidence of the relationship 
between the parties at the time of the survey. In particular, he 
asserted the diary would show Strawberry River—not third-party 
plaintiffs—hired the surveyors.7 
We defer to the trial court's decision about whether a 
proper foundation for evidence admission M*is laid and sufficient 
showing of the credibility of the evidence is established. The 
ruling of the trial court in this regard will not be overturned 
unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion.'" Procon 
Corp. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 876 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah App. 
1994) (quoting State ex rel. Marcruez, 560 P.2d 342, 342-43 (Utah 
1977) (footnote omitted)). 
Hearsay is ,fa statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.11 Utah R. 
Evid. 801(c). Stafford's diary was indeed hearsay. It contained 
statements by Stafford, who could not testify at the trial, 
offered to prove the truth of Calder's assertion that Strawberry 
River—not third-party plaintiffs—hired the surveyor. 
However, business records satisfying the criteria of Utah 
Rule of Evidence 803(6) are not excluded as hearsay.8 "For 
7. He also asserted the diary would show the surveyors based 
their survey on the "Edmund Allen plat," see supra note 2, not 
the metes and bounds description on the uniform real estate 
contract. We address this assertion in footnote nine. 
8. Utah Rule of Evidence 803(6) states: 
Records of regularly conducted activity. A 
memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 
conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or 
near the time by . . . a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business 
activity to make the . . . data compilation, 
(continued...) 
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evidence to be admissible as a business record, a proper 
foundation must be laid to establish the necessary indicia of 
reliability." State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983). 
The four requirements for a proper foundation are as follows: 
"(1) the record must be made in the regular 
course of the business or entity which keeps 
the records; (2) the record must have been 
made at the time of, or in close proximity 
to, the occurrence of the act, condition or 
event recorded; (3) the evidence must support 
a conclusion that after recordation the 
document was kept under circumstances that 
would preserve its integrity; and (4) the 
sources of the information from which the 
entry was made and the circumstances of the 
preparation of the document were such as to 
indicate its trustworthiness." 
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 33 
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184). The 
foundation must be laid using "the testimony of the custodian [of 
business records] or other qualified witness." See Utah R. Evid. 
803(6). 
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 
rejecting the testimony of Floyd Ostler, Stafford's co-worker in 
1972, as a "qualified witness" to establish a proper foundation 
for admitting Stafford's diary.9 "The foundation facts may be 
8. (...continued) 
all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, unless 
the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness . . . . 
9. Admittedly, Calder's counsel unartfully laid the foundation; 
however, we construe "rules governing the business record 
exception broadly." Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1183. See also In re 
Japanese Electronic Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 289 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(stating "the regular practice requirement should be generously 
construed to favor admission"). 
Also, Calder/s counsel initially tried to use Calder's 
testimony to establish a foundation for the diary's admission. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit 
the diary based on Calder's testimony. Calder was not a 
"qualified witness" under Rule 803(6). He was not in business 
with Stafford at the time of the survey and was not "a person 
with knowledge," Utah R. Evid. 803(6). 
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proved by any relevant evidence and the person making the entries 
in the records need not be called to authenticate them if they 
can be identified by someone else who is qualified by knowledge 
of the facts." Olathe Readv-Mix Co. v. Frazier, 556 P.2d 198, 
199 (Kan. 1976); see also Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 981 
(Utah 1993) ("[R]ule 803(6) allows any qualified witness to lay 
the proper foundation for a record, not just the custodian or the 
person who created the record. ••) . 
Meeting requirements one and two of the Bertul standard, 
Ostler's testimony established that Stafford's diary was kept in 
the regular course of their business and contemporaneous with the 
events of 1972. He stated, "I'm aware that he [Stafford] did 
keep a diary and he knew he was keeping one at the same time 
because each one of us [Gunderson, Ostler, and Stafford] got a 
diary at the same time." Also, confirming its contemporaneous 
nature, the diary contains regular dated entries regarding the 
trio's survey activities. See In re Japanese Electronic Prods.. 
723 F.2d at 288 (stating "requirements for qualification as a 
business record can be met by . . . a combination of direct and 
circumstantial evidence"). 
Requirements three and four address the trustworthiness or 
reliability of the diary (i.e., preservation of integrity and 
circumstances of preparation). Bertul. 664 P.2d at 1184. A 
court need not "independently analyze the procedures used by a 
business or its employees in making regularly kept records of 
regularly conducted business activity. The principal indice 
[sic] of reliability is that reliance on routine record keeping 
is essential to ongoing business activity." In re Japanese 
Electronic Prods.. 723 F.2d at 289. In other words, when the 
proponent of a document meets requirements one and two—regarding 
routine, contemporaneous record keeping—a presumption arises 
that the document is admissible as a trustworthy or reliable 
business record. The burden then shifts to the opponent of the 
evidence to "overcomefe] that badge of reliability by showing 
other reasons for untrustworthiness." Id. at 291. 
Here, we have already concluded Calder met requirements one 
and two with the testimony of a "qualified witness"; thus, the 
burden shifted to third-party plaintiffs to "show[] other reasons 
for untrustworthiness," id., under requirements three and four. 
Third-party plaintiffs objected to the admission of Stafford's 
diary because Ostler's testimony was being used to establish a 
foundation for admission. Their objection challenged the 
"qualified witness" criterion, not the inherent trustworthiness 
of the diary. Thus, third-party plaintiffs did not overcome the 
presumption that the diary was admissible. Accordingly, the 
trial court abused its discretion when it refused to admit 
Stafford's diary into evidence under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
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B. Harmless error 
However, our inquiry does not end here. The trial court's 
error in refusing to admit the diary was harmless. •• [E]rrors 
which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected 
the substantial rights of the party complaining, when substantial 
justice has been done, do not require reversal." State v. 
Mitchell. 672 P.2d 1, 9 (Kan. 1983); see also State ex. rel. J.C. 
v. Cruz. 808 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Utah App. 1991) (holding admission 
of evidence harmless because error likely did not change result). 
Calder's purpose in introducing the diary was "to clarify 
who hired whom to do what, when the survey was performed, the 
location of the survey, etc."10 Because the survey's time and 
location are not at issue, we need not address the diary's 
ability to clarify those details. We must, however, determine 
whether the identity of the original surveyors' employer affects 
the result of the negligence analysis. In particular, we must 
determine whether third-party plaintiffs may prevail in a 
negligence action against Calder, even if Strawberry River hired 
the original surveyors. 
The negligent surveyor in Price-Orem Investment Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc.. 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986), argued 
its obligations ran only to the general contractor, the party 
with whom it had contracted to survey a shopping center site. 
Id. at 59. The surveyor asserted that because the owner of the 
site—the general contractor's employer—was not in privity of 
contract with the surveyor, it had no standing to sue the 
surveyor for negligence. Id. Holding "privity of contract is 
not a necessary prerequisite to liability," the Utah Supreme 
10. He also wanted the diary to show that Strawberry River had 
given the survey party the "Edmund Allen plat" as a basis for the 
survey. Third-party plaintiffs' contrary position was that they 
had given the survey party the metes and bounds description on 
the second real estate contract as a basis for the survey. 
Because the surveyors apparently did properly stake out lots 31 
and 32, as depicted on the "Edmund Allen plat," Calder may have 
hoped to show that the survey therefore was not negligent. 
Calder's argument fails to account for the fact that both the 
proper dimensions of lots 31 and 32 and the incorrect metes and 
bounds description appear on the survey certificate. Apparently, 
the surveyors used both documents to prepare the certificate. 
Because the dimensions of lots 31 and 32 and the metes and bounds 
description conflict, a discrepancy appears on the certificate 
Calder signed. Calder's argument that the surveyors used the 
"Edmund Allen plat" as the sole basis for the survey is in error. 
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Court applied a negligent misrepresentation analysis. Id. The 
tort of negligent misrepresentation allows a party 
injured by reasonable reliance upon a second 
party's careless or negligent 
misrepresentation of a material fact [to] 
recover damages resulting from that injury 
when the second party had a pecuniary 
interest in the transaction, was in a 
superior position to know the material facts, 
and should have reasonably foreseen that the 
injured party was likely to rely upon the 
fact. 
Id. 
We first address the reliance element. The trial court's 
findings regarding third-party plaintiff's reliance on "second 
party" Calder's negligent misrepresentation of a material fact— 
i.e., the survey certificate's surface discrepancies regarding 
the property boundaries—are unchallenged.11 The court found 
third-party plaintiffs relied on the survey certificate in two 
ways: (1) They used the certificate when they showed the 
property and its corner markers to the Klingers, the future 
buyers of the property, and (2) they gave the Klingers a deed 
with a legal metes and bounds description "confirmed by the 
Certificate of Survey." Thus, third-party plaintiffs meet the 
reliance requirement. 
Second, we determine whether "second party" Calder "had a 
pecuniary interest in the transaction," id. Although the trial 
court made no direct findings on this aspect, Calder admitted in 
his trial testimony, "I agreed that for a fee I would sign the 
[survey certificate]." Calder's fee gave him the requisite 
pecuniary interest. 
11. Calder does challenge third-party plaintiffs' reliance on 
the survey certificate in the technical transfer of the property, 
in that the deed conveying the property from third-party 
plaintiffs to the Klingers mirrored the metes and bounds 
description found on third-party plaintiffs' deed, not the 
inaccurate description found on the certificate. Because third-
party plaintiffs regarded the 10-foot discrepancy between the 
description on the certificate and the description on their own 
deed to be a minor error not warranting attention, see supra p. 
5, the trial court reasonably could have found they continued to 
rely on the certificate in drafting the Klingers' deed. See Cook 
Consultants. Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231, 234-37 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding indirect reliance is sufficient). 
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Third, we conclude Calder "was in a superior position to 
know the material facts," id. A licensed professional surveyor, 
Calder—unlike the laymen third-party plaintiffs—had the 
training and experience to verify the survey results. 
Finally, we consider whether Calder "should have reasonably 
foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely upon the 
[survey certificate]," id. In Price-Orem, the supreme court 
summarily stated, "Price-Orem, as the owner of the property for 
whose benefit the shopping center was being constructed [by the 
contractor who ordered the survey], was clearly a party whose 
justifiable reliance upon the accuracy of the survey might be 
reasonably foreseen." Jd. at 60. We likewise conclude that 
third-party plaintiffs as the owners of the property for whose 
benefit the survey was done, were "clearly a party whose 
justifiable reliance upon the accuracy of the survey might be 
reasonably foreseen," id. 
We therefore determine that whether third-party plaintiffs 
or Strawberry River hired the original surveyors does not affect 
the validity of the trial court's negligence analysis. Thus, the 
trial court's refusal to admit Stafford's diary did not prejudice 
Calder's substantial rights and reversal is not required.12 See 
Mitchell, 672 P.2d at 9; State ex. rel. J.C.. 808 P.2d at 1136. 
III. Damages 
Calder lumps under his argument against the award of damages 
the following grievances with the trial court's decision: (1) 
Damages should not have been awarded because Calder did not 
proximately cause third-party plaintiffs' damages; (2) the trial 
court improperly measured damages; (3) damages awarded were not 
foreseeable; and (4) the trial court's assessment of the 
property's fair market value was unsupported by the evidence. 
A. Causation 
Calder argues that, even if he was negligent, his signing of 
the survey certificate did not proximately cause third-party 
plaintiffs' injury. Our review of surveyor negligence cases 
shows courts typically find proximate cause to exist when an 
injured plaintiff relied on the surveyor's negligent 
misrepresentation and the surveyor could foresee that reliance. 
See Bell v. Jones, 523 A.2d 982, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Walker v. 
Hurd. 394 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (reliance only); 
Hostetler v. W. Gray & Co.. 523 So. 2d 1359, 1368 (La. Ct. App. 
12. Alternatively, the trial court could have used the above 
analysis to support a ruling that the diary was irrelevant under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402. 
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1988) (same); McKinnon v. Batte, 485 So. 2d 295, 299 (Miss. 1986) 
(same); Cook Consultants. Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231, 237 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985) ; see also Steffenson v. Smiths Management 
Co.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993) ("[F]oreseeability is an 
element of proximate cause.") We have already decided third-
party plaintiffs relied on Calder's negligent misrepresentation 
and their reliance was reasonably foreseeable by Calder; thus, we 
need not further address this argument.13 
13. Calder cursorily advances two other arguments against 
finding he proximately caused third-party plaintiffs/ damages. 
First, he contends Strawberry River, not Calder, caused the 
damages. After all, Strawberry River originated the inaccurate 
metes and bounds description when it prepared the second real 
estate contract. Alternatively, he argues that whoever drafted 
the deed conveying the property from third-party plaintiffs to 
the Klingers caused the damages. That draftsman duplicated in 
the Klingers' deed the inaccurate metes and bounds description 
found in third-party plaintiffs' deed. 
"Proximate cause" is a cause substantially connected to the 
plaintiff's injury. See McCorvev v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 
868 P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993); Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.. 853 
P.2d 877, 887 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Hall v. 
Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 169, 417 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1966); 
George v. LPS HOSP.. 797 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Utah App. 1990) 
(quoting Hamil v. Bashline. 392 A.2d 1280, 1289 (Pa. 1978)), 
cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (1991). Causation is a question of 
fact. House v. Armour of America, Inc., 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 
19 (Utah App. 1994). We review the trial court's findings of 
fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a); Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 
1993). A trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous 
only if they are not supported by the clear weight of the 
evidence, Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989), as 
viewed in a light most favorable to the findings, State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
We cannot say the trial court's finding that Calder 
proximately caused third-party plaintiffs7 injury was clearly 
erroneous. The record supports the trial court's implicit 
determination that neither Strawberry River nor the drafter of 
the Klingers' deed proximately caused third-party plaintiffs' 
injury, even though they may have "actually caused" it. See 
Sullivan. 853 P.2d at 887 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Many causes can combine to produce an effect, with one or 
more emerging as the proximate cause. See id.; George, 797 P.2d 
at 1122 (quoting Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1289); Hess v. Robinson. 109 
Utah 60, 62-63, 163 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah 1945). Strawberry 
River's "negligence" could have been termed a "remote cause," see 
Hess. 163 P.2d at 511, or a "superseded cause," see McCorvev. 868 
(continued...) 
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B. Measure of damages 
Calder contends the trial court applied the wrong measure of 
damages. To calculate damages, the trial court subtracted the 
"present" value of third-party plaintiffs' forty acres ($6,000) 
from the price at which third-party plaintiffs sold the original 
property to the Klingers ($32,000), then added the closing costs 
on that sale ($3,383), for a total of $29,383. We affirm the 
trial court's award of damages as a "pecuniary loss suffered . . 
. as a consequence of the plaintiff's reliance upon [Calder's] 
misrepresentation." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552B(1)(b) 
(1976); see Acculocr, Inc. v. Peterson. 692 P.2d 728, 731 (Utah 
1984) . 
C. Foreseeability of damages 
Because the property's value soared from the time of the 
survey to the time third-party plaintiffs sold the property to 
the Klingers, then plummeted before the Klingers rescinded the 
land contract, Calder argues the damages were not foreseeable. 
In other words, he contends he should not have to compensate 
third-party plaintiffs for an "artificial spike" in the region's 
real estate market, when they now own the same property they have 
always owned, excluding the Klingers' truncated tenure. This 
argument is without merit. A licensed surveyor—like Calder— 
regularly dealing with real estate should be aware of the 
potential over time for wide fluctuations in property values. 
Thus, he could reasonably be expected to foresee that a 
negligently performed survey can result in future damages 
commensurate with those fluctuations. 
13. (...continued) 
P.2d at 45. The trial court found the survey was done 
specifically to verify the property description originated by 
Strawberry River. The trial court could have found that if the 
survey had been done correctly, it would have alerted third-party 
plaintiffs to the inaccurate metes and bounds description; they 
would then have been able to immediately seek redress from 
Strawberry River. Years later, Strawberry River is defunct and 
that remedy is no longer available. "But for" their reliance on 
Calder's survey, third-party plaintiffs could have cured their 
initial injury at the hands of Strawberry River long ago. See 
Weber ex rel. Weber v. Sprinaville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367 
(Utah 1986). 
Also, third-party plaintiffs obviously did not rely to their 
injury on the property description in the Klinger's deed; they 
relied on the description in their own deed and in the survey 
certificate. Thus, the drafter of the Klinger's deed did not 
proximately cause their injury. 
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D. Trial court's assessment of fair market value 
Calder maintains the trial court's determination of the 
property's "present" fair market value at $6,000 was unsupported 
by the evidence. We presume a trial court's award of damages to 
be correct and will overturn it only if it is clearly erroneous 
with no reasonable support in the evidence. Gillmor v. Gillmor, 
745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 
(1988) . 
A real estate appraiser testified third-party plaintiffs had 
received an offer for $10,000, but "[i]t was with a thousand 
dollars down which would barely cover their costs so they 
basically would get nothing out of it, and then it was on a 10-
year payoff." He further testified that "if they could get 8,000 
cash . . . they'd be doing very well." Finally, he stated he had 
recently sold a nearby fifty-two acres "that's better than 
theirs" for $3,000. The trial court reasonably valued the 
property at $6,000, well within the range of values proposed by 
the expert witness. Accordingly, we cannot say this finding is 
clearly erroneous or without support in the record. 
IV. Prejudgment Interest 
Calder argues the trial court erred in awarding third-party 
plaintiffs prejudgment interest. The award of prejudgment 
interest is a question of law, which we review for correctness. 
Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah App. 1994). 
The following guidelines apply to awards of prejudgment 
interest: 
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount 
of loss fixed as of a particular time, and 
that loss can be measured by facts and 
figures, interest should be allowed from that 
time and not from the date of the judgment. 
On the other hand, where damages are 
incomplete or cannot be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy . . . the amount of the 
damage must be ascertained and assessed by 
the trier of the fact at the trial, and in 
such cases prejudgment interest is not 
allowed. 
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 
475, 482 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Biork v. April Indus., Inc., 
560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930 
(1977)). In Price-Orem, this court denied the plaintiff 
prejudgment interest because "damages ascertained by determining 
the fair market value of real property . . . xcannot be 
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determined with mathematical precision, [and] may be inherently 
uncertain.'" Id. at 483 (quoting Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 
1316, 1325 (Wyo. 1984)). 
Here, the trial court calculated the damages using the 
"present" fair market value of the property. The imprecise 
testimony of the real estate appraiser quoted above shows that 
the amount fixed by the trial court was calculated with 
mathematical inaccuracy and was inherently uncertain. Thus, the 
trial court erred when it awarded third-party plaintiffs 
prejudgment interest. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court in observing the supreme court's 
application of the discovery rule to this case and awarding 
damages. Further, we conclude that the trial court's rejection 
of Stafford's diary as evidence was harmless error. We also 
reverse the trial court's award of prejudgment interest to third-
party plaintiffs. We remand this case to the trial court to 
revise the judgment in accordance with this opinion. 
Norman H. Jacks^f Judge 
£--CONCUR; 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
I CONCUR IN RESULT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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